“Asia is not just India’s neighborhood — it is the center of gravity of the 21st century. India must be central to Asia, not peripheral.” — S. Jaishankar
The 21st century is, in a very real sense, Asia’s century. The region already contains more than half of humanity, more than half of global GDP on purchasing power parity, and the world’s most dynamic economies. The contest for the rules and institutions of the emerging world order is, to a significant degree, a contest over the shape of Asia.
For India, this is both obvious and complex. India is an Asian power — indeed, one of Asia’s greatest — but its position in the Asian strategic landscape is contested, its neighborhood is challenging, and its relationships with major Asian powers are complicated.
Jaishankar’s argument is that India must aspire to be a shaping power in Asia, not merely an adapting one. This requires a proactive regional strategy across several theaters.
India’s immediate neighborhood — South Asia — is simultaneously its most important and most frustrating strategic environment. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has largely failed to deliver regional integration. Pakistan’s strategic hostility has prevented connectivity with Afghanistan and beyond. Small neighbors — Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bhutan, Myanmar — oscillate between closeness to India and receptiveness to Chinese influence.
The “Neighborhood First” policy articulated by Prime Minister Modi represents an aspiration to give India’s immediate periphery the priority attention it deserves — through connectivity projects, economic assistance, disaster response, and sustained diplomatic engagement.
But China’s engagement in South Asia through the Belt and Road Initiative — from the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka to engagement in Nepal and Bangladesh — has complicated the regional picture significantly.
China’s growing presence in South Asia reflects a broader pattern of competitive engagement with India’s traditional sphere of influence. From an Indian perspective, Chinese infrastructure investments and political relationships in South Asia represent:
India’s response has evolved from alarm to active counter-engagement. Indian infrastructure investment in neighboring countries has accelerated. Indian diplomatic attention to neighborhood relationships has intensified. The recognition has grown that India cannot simply assume South Asian primacy — it must earn it through delivery.
“Indo-Pacific” is a relatively new strategic concept — one that India has embraced enthusiastically because it positions India at the center rather than the periphery of the relevant geographic theater.
The concept connects the Indian Ocean — India’s home waters, where it has historically been the dominant naval power — with the Pacific Ocean, where the US-China competition is most intense. This connectivity is not just geographic — it reflects real economic and security linkages.
Indian trade moves through the Indian Ocean. Energy imports (oil, LNG) flow through the Strait of Malacca. The sea lanes connecting the Gulf, Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia pass through waters where India has genuine strategic interests and, increasingly, genuine naval capability.
The Indo-Pacific framework gives India a geographic rationale for its expanding strategic horizon — from the Gulf to Southeast Asia to Japan.
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue — India, the United States, Japan, and Australia — is the most significant multilateral strategic initiative India has joined in decades. Originally conceived after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami for humanitarian coordination, the Quad has evolved into a regular diplomatic and security forum with an explicitly strategic orientation.
The Quad’s significance lies in what it represents: India’s willingness to participate in a strategic grouping explicitly organized around concerns about Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific.
This is notable precisely because it represents a departure from India’s traditional aversion to multilateral alignments. The Quad is not a formal alliance — there are no mutual defense commitments. But it is a strategic signal: India is willing to align with like-minded democracies against specific behaviors that threaten the regional order.
What the Quad does:
India’s “Act East” policy — a rebranding and acceleration of the older “Look East” policy — reflects the recognition that Southeast Asia is a critical theater for Indian strategic interests and economic opportunities.
ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) represents 660 million people, a combined economy of $3+ trillion, and a geographic position at the heart of global trade routes. The region sits at the intersection of Indian and Chinese strategic competition.
India’s engagement with Southeast Asia includes:
Southeast Asian countries, for their part, generally welcome Indian engagement as a counterbalance to Chinese dominance — they do not want to choose between Beijing and Washington, and India’s presence provides additional strategic options.
Japan and India share structural interests that make them natural partners in the Indo-Pacific order: both are large democracies, both are concerned about Chinese revisionism, and both seek a rules-based regional order.
The India-Japan relationship has deepened significantly, from defense cooperation to infrastructure investment (Japan is the largest investor in Indian infrastructure through the bullet train and other projects) to technology collaboration.
Jaishankar describes Japan as among India’s most important strategic partners — a relationship that combines shared interests, complementary capabilities, and genuine mutual respect.