“India need not choose between America and China. It can, and should, build the best possible relationship with each on its own merits.” — S. Jaishankar
The defining geopolitical feature of the 21st century is the intensifying rivalry between the United States and China. This contest — for technological supremacy, for economic influence, for security dominance in Asia, for the rules of the international order — will shape the environment in which every other country must operate for decades to come.
For India, this rivalry creates both opportunity and risk. The opportunity: both powers need India’s alignment and are willing to offer significant incentives to secure it. The risk: pressures to choose sides could lock India into alignments that serve American or Chinese interests more than Indian ones.
Jaishankar’s approach to this central tension is characteristically pragmatic: India should engage both powers, maintain its strategic autonomy, and advance its specific interests with each — without allowing the US-China contest to become the organizing principle of Indian foreign policy.
The India-US relationship is one of the most dramatic diplomatic transformations of the 21st century. From a Cold War relationship characterized by suspicion, sanctions, and mutual frustration, it has evolved into what both sides describe as a “defining partnership.”
The transformation began with Prime Minister Vajpayee’s characterization of India and America as “natural allies” in 1998 and accelerated under the UPA and NDA governments that followed. The 2005 civilian nuclear deal — through which the US effectively recognized India as a legitimate nuclear power and opened civilian nuclear cooperation — was the watershed moment.
The drivers of convergence are real:
But the relationship has genuine limits, and Jaishankar is frank about them:
Divergent interests on Pakistan: American policy toward Pakistan — treating it as an indispensable partner despite its harboring of terrorist groups targeting India — remains a fundamental source of friction.
Trade tensions: American complaints about Indian tariff and non-tariff barriers, data localization, and market access restrictions periodically generate real diplomatic friction.
Different views on Russia: India’s close defense relationship with Russia — built over decades when America was less reliable — creates tension with American preferences, particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Sovereignty and democracy conditionality: American pressure on internal governance matters (press freedom, minority rights, democratic backsliding) periodically creates friction with Indian governments that prefer not to be lectured.
Jaishankar’s framework: engage the United States as a critical partner on specific issues while maintaining the independence to disagree on others.
India’s relationship with China is the most complex, consequential, and potentially dangerous relationship in Indian foreign policy. It encompasses:
The 1962 war — in which China decisively defeated Indian forces and occupied significant territory — remains a psychological scar in Indian strategic thinking. More recent confrontations at Doklam (2017) and Galwan Valley (2020) have renewed concerns about Chinese strategic intentions.
The 2017 Doklam standoff was a significant test of Indian strategic resolve. When Chinese troops began building a road on disputed territory claimed by Bhutan — a country under Indian security protection — India deployed forces to block them.
For 73 days, Indian and Chinese troops faced each other in a tense standoff that tested both sides’ willingness to risk conflict. The resolution — a mutual disengagement without India backing down — established an important precedent: India would not accept unilateral Chinese land seizures without resistance.
India and China have fundamentally different visions of the emerging Asian order:
China’s vision: A Sinocentric Asia in which China is the dominant power, smaller states accept Chinese primacy, and the United States is pushed back to the Pacific. The Belt and Road Initiative is a concrete expression of this vision.
India’s vision: A multipolar Asia with multiple significant powers, no single hegemon, and robust institutions that prevent any power from dominating. India’s participation in the Quad (with the US, Japan, and Australia) expresses this vision.
These visions are not merely competing preferences — they are structurally incompatible. China’s rise to Asian dominance would necessarily come at India’s expense. India’s insistence on multipolarity necessarily limits China’s ambitions.
Despite the strategic competition, India and China are deeply economically interdependent. Chinese goods fill Indian markets. Indian pharmaceutical companies rely on Chinese APIs. Technology supply chains run through China.
This economic dependency creates a paradox: India’s security requires limiting Chinese strategic influence, but India’s economy relies significantly on Chinese trade and supply chains. Navigating this paradox — managing economic interdependence while resisting strategic subordination — is one of the defining challenges of Indian foreign policy.
Jaishankar’s central prescriptive argument about the US-China rivalry is that India should refuse to choose between them as an organizing principle of its foreign policy.
Choosing between the US and China would require India to:
Instead, India’s optimal strategy is to:
This is not naive neutrality — India clearly tilts toward the US in the areas that matter most (defense, technology, democratic norms). But it is principled flexibility — maintaining the freedom to engage China economically and to resist being enlisted in American China policy that doesn’t serve Indian interests.