India’s unity has always been challenged by regional movements demanding autonomy, recognition, or even independence. This chapter examines the regional challenges from the 1960s through the 1970s—from Tamil nationalism to demands for smaller states.
In Tamil Nadu, the Dravidian movement rejected Hindi, Brahmanism, and northern dominance. The DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) championed Tamil identity and, initially, separatism.
In the 1960s, the DMK advocated secession—a separate Dravida Nadu. But after the 16th Constitutional Amendment made secessionist parties illegal, the DMK dropped separatism. It won power in 1967 and has governed Tamil Nadu (alternating with its offshoot AIADMK) ever since.
The DMK showed that regional parties could achieve power and protect regional interests within the Indian union. Separatism was unnecessary when federalism worked.
The northeast remained troubled. The Naga insurgency continued. Mizo insurgents launched an uprising in 1966. Assamese resented Bengali refugees. The region’s integration into India remained incomplete.
In 1966, the Mizo National Front launched an armed rebellion. The Indian Air Force strafed Aizawl—the only time the IAF bombed Indian citizens. The insurgency continued until 1986, when a peace accord brought Laldenga (the insurgent leader) into democratic politics.
Various regions demanded separate statehood. The hill areas of Assam wanted separation from the Assamese-dominated plains. Jharkhand tribals demanded a state separate from Bihar. Uttarakhand (then Uttaranchal) wanted separation from UP.
Some of these demands were accommodated. Meghalaya, Manipur, and Tripura became full states in 1972. Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh followed later. But demands from Jharkhand, Uttarakhand, and Chhattisgarh would wait until 2000.
The Congress’s long dominance at both central and state levels masked underlying federal tensions. When non-Congress governments emerged in states, conflict with the Centre intensified.
The Constitution’s Article 356 allowed the Centre to dismiss state governments and impose “President’s Rule.” This provision, meant for emergencies, was increasingly abused for political purposes—to remove inconvenient opposition governments on flimsy pretexts.
In Punjab, the Akali Dal represented Sikh political aspirations. They demanded greater autonomy for Punjab, control over Chandigarh (shared with Haryana), and more river waters. These demands were framed in religious as well as regional terms.
In 1973, the Akali Dal passed the Anandpur Sahib Resolution demanding radical devolution of powers. While not secessionist, it sought a weak Centre with states controlling most functions. The Congress saw this as a threat to national unity.
The Punjab issue would explode in the 1980s. But its roots lay in long-standing grievances and the Centre’s unwillingness to accommodate Sikh political demands.
The merger of Telangana (former Hyderabad state) with Andhra in 1956 created resentments. Telangana felt dominated by coastal Andhra. An agitation in 1969 demanded a separate Telangana state.
Students led violent protests. More than 300 people died. The movement was suppressed, and promises of safeguards were made but poorly implemented. The grievance persisted, erupting again in the 2000s and finally succeeding in 2014.
India’s regional movements followed different paths. Some, like Tamil nationalism, were accommodated within the federal structure and became pillars of the system. Others, like the Naga and Mizo insurgencies, required decades of conflict before settlement. Still others, like Telangana, simmered for decades before eventual resolution.
India’s federal structure—imperfect as it was—provided mechanisms for accommodating regional aspirations. Unlike unitary states that faced separatism, India’s regions could seek power within the system. This flexibility may have saved the nation from Balkanization.