In May 1998, India conducted nuclear tests at Pokhran, declaring itself a nuclear weapons state. This chapter examines India’s nuclear journey, the 1998 tests, the international response, and the Kargil War that followed—testing the limits of nuclear deterrence.
India’s nuclear program began in the 1950s under Homi Bhabha, ostensibly for peaceful purposes. The first nuclear test came in 1974 under Indira Gandhi—a “peaceful nuclear explosion” that fooled no one but allowed India to maintain ambiguity.
On May 11, 1998, India conducted three nuclear tests at Pokhran. Two more followed on May 13. The tests included a thermonuclear (hydrogen bomb) device. India announced it was now a nuclear weapons state.
The tests were conducted in complete secrecy, evading American satellites. The scientific achievement was undeniable. But the political decision to cross the nuclear threshold had profound implications for South Asian security.
“India is now a nuclear weapons state. This is a matter of national pride.” — Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, May 1998
Within weeks, Pakistan conducted its own tests—six explosions on May 28 and 30. South Asia was now overtly nuclearized. Two hostile neighbors, with unresolved territorial disputes, possessed weapons of mass destruction.
The India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry was unlike the US-Soviet standoff. The countries shared a border. Warning times were minimal. Command and control systems were less robust. The risk of accidental or unauthorized use was real.
The United States, Japan, and other countries imposed sanctions on India (and Pakistan). India was condemned for undermining the non-proliferation regime. But the sanctions had limited effect and were gradually lifted.
Within India, the tests were wildly popular. Nuclear weapons were seen as markers of great power status. Vajpayee’s popularity soared. The strategic elite had long advocated weaponization; now it was achieved.
In February 1999, Vajpayee took a bus to Lahore to meet Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The Lahore Declaration committed both countries to peaceful resolution of disputes. Hope briefly flourished.
Vajpayee’s bus diplomacy captured imaginations. The two leaders signed agreements on nuclear confidence-building measures. For a moment, it seemed nuclear weapons might actually promote peace by making war unthinkable.
The hope was short-lived. In early 1999, Pakistani soldiers and militants infiltrated Indian-controlled Kargil in Kashmir. India launched a military operation to evict them. For the first time, two nuclear-armed states fought a war.
The Kargil War was fought with conventional weapons, but nuclear weapons lurked in the background. India deliberately did not cross the Line of Control. Pakistan calculated that nuclear deterrence would prevent Indian escalation. The war ended with Pakistani withdrawal.
Kargil showed that nuclear weapons did not prevent war—only limited it. Pakistan’s military was discredited; Musharraf soon overthrew Sharif. India’s military performance was vindicated. But the fundamental problem—Kashmir—remained unresolved.
“Kargil proved that nuclear weapons do not make peace inevitable. They make large-scale war unlikely, but limited conflict remains possible—and perhaps more tempting for risk-takers.” — Ramachandra Guha
India eventually articulated a nuclear doctrine based on “no first use” and “credible minimum deterrence.” Unlike Pakistan, India pledged not to use nuclear weapons first. Whether this doctrine would hold in a crisis remained untested.